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0. intrOductiOn
0.1. Stating the problem
Descriptions of modality in English often give the impression that 
the behaviour of modal verbs is erratic when they occur with negation. A 
particularly intriguing case is the behaviour of the modal verb must under 
negation. In its deontic sense, must is used both in affirmative and negated 
sentences, expressing obligation (1a) and prohibition (1b), respectively. 
In its epistemic sense, however, must is only used in affirmative sentences 
expressing necessity (2a). The modal verb that expresses the corresponding 
negated epistemic modality, i.e. impossibility, is can’t (2b).
(1) a. You must switch off your mobile phone. [obligation]
 b. You mustn’t switch off your mobile phone. [prohibition]
(2) a. Your mobile phone must be switched off.  [necessity]
 b. Your mobile phone can’t be switched off. [impossibility]
Explanations that have been offered for the use of epistemic can’t are not 
very helpful. Palmer (1990: 61) argues that mustn’t is not used for the negation 
of epistemic necessity because can’t is supplied, and Coates (1983: 20) 
suggests that can’t is used because mustn’t is unavailable. both “explanations” 
beg the question: why should can’t be used to denote negated necessity and 
why should mustn’t be unavailable? Such questions have apparently not been 
asked for two interrelated reasons: first, the study of modality and negation has 
been dominated by logic and, secondly, since the modal verbs apparently do 
* An earlier version of this paper was published in Władysław Chłopicki, Andrzej Pawelec, and 
Agnieszka Pokojska (eds.), 2007, Cognition in Language: Volume in Honour of Professor Elżbieta 
Tabakowska, 224-254. Kraków: Tertium.
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not follow principles of logic when they co-occur with negation, their irregular 
behaviour seems to be unmotivated. 
0.2. The logic of modality and negation
The negation of a modal sentence can affect the modality or the proposition. 
The negator not does not reveal which expression(s) are negated. The scope of 
negation is only visible in the paraphrases of negated modal sentences. Thus, 
sentence (1b) can be paraphrased as ‘it is necessary for you NOT to switch off 
your mobile phone’, i.e. the proposition is negated, while sentence (2b) can be 
paraphrased as ‘it is NOT possible that your mobile phone is switched off’, i.e. 
the modality is negated.
The negations of a modality and a proposition are inversely equivalent. 
Negating a possibility is logically equivalent to stating a necessity that 
something is not the case and, conversely, negating a necessity is logically 
equivalent to stating a possibility that something is not the case. These inverse 
relationships between necessity and possibility can be represented by using the 
following logical notations, where “≡” stands for logical equivalence, “p” for 
proposition, and “∼” for negation.
(3)  a. poss p ≡ ∼nec ∼p  It is possible that this is true. =  
  It is not necessarily the case this is not true.
 b. nec p ≡ ∼poss ∼p  It is necessarily the case that this is true. = 
  It is not possible that this is not true.
 c. ∼poss p ≡ nec ∼p It is not possible that this is true. = 
  It is necessarily the case that this is not true.
 d. ∼nec p ≡ poss ∼p It is not necessarily the case that this is true.= 
  It is possible that this is not true.
These four pairs of equivalence relations provide the basic system of modal 
concepts, and we might ideally expect to find each of these modal concepts 
coded by a modal verb of its own. That is, if language was built on logic, 
we should expect to find eight modal verbs neatly corresponding to each of 
these eight modal concepts. Human language is, however, structured by its 
own principles, and it shouldn’t come as a surprise that linguistic distinctions 
do not match those of logic.
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0.3. Motivational principles of language use
A number of communicative and cognitive principles, most of which derive 
from the overriding principle of relevance, motivate the use of language. 
According to the principle of relevance, the hearer assumes that the wording 
chosen by the speaker optimally expresses her communicative intention and 
does not require any unnecessary processing effort. In the case of modals and 
negations, this principle accounts for our preference for the non-negated modal 
expressions in (3a) and (3b), i.e. ‘poss p’ and ‘nec p’, over the doubly negated 
ones, i.e. ‘∼nec ∼p’ and ‘∼poss ∼p’, which require complex processing efforts. 
Compare the following sentences, which correspond to the logical equivalence 
stated under (3a):
(4) a.  It is possible that Noam Chomsky has developed a new  
  linguistic  theory.
 b.  Noam Chomsky may have developed a new linguistic  
  theory.
 c.  It is not necessarily the case that Noam Chomsky has not 
  developed a new linguistic theory. 
Sentences (4a) and (4b) involve affirmative modal statements. Interpreting 
an affirmative sentence requires less processing effort than interpreting its 
negated equivalent, as in (4c). As convincingly argued in blending theory 
(see Fauconnier & Turner 2002: Ch. 11 “The construction of the unreal”), a 
negation requires the activation of its corresponding counterfactual space. 
In processing the meaning of two negations as in sentence (4c), the hearer 
needs to activate two counterfactual spaces: a space in which Noam Chomsky 
has developed a new theory and a space in which this is necessarily the case. 
The meanings conveyed by the affirmative sentences (4a) and (4b) are not 
only more transparent than that of the doubly negated sentence (4c), but the 
wordings used in them are also considerably shorter. The use of affirmative 
sentences as opposed to doubly negated sentences is thus also motivated by the 
principle of clarity and the principle of economy. 
The affirmative concept ‘possible that p’ is in (4a) expressed by the modal 
clause it is possible that and in (4b) by the modal verb may. The modal verb 
may represents a unitary linguistic category. Categories that are lexicalised 
express collections of particularly meaningful and relevant experiences. 
According to the principle of meaningfulness, the modal verb may has thus 
been formed because it expresses a meaningful and relevant modal concept. 
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The concept ‘not necessary that not’ does not represent a similarly meaningful 
and relevant concept: hence there is no modal verb available to express this 
notion. Although such doubly negated modal concepts are rarely coded as 
simple lexicalised categories they convey distinct meanings of their own and 
occupy their specific ecological niches within the system of modality. While 
affirmative modalities only express the potentiality that a state of affairs holds, 
their negated counterparts involve further assumptions underlying the modal 
statements. Thus, sentence (4c) carries the assumption that Noam Chomsky 
has developed, or has the potential to develop, new linguistic theories. 
A cognitive principle that has tacitly been adduced in explaining the 
distribution of modal forms is the principle of isomorphism. According to this 
principle, there is a close connection between a form and its meaning. Ideally, 
one form is matched by one meaning and the same or similar meanings are 
expressed by the same form. The “explanations” for the irregular behaviour of 
mustn’t and can’t cited above tacitly assume that their use is (solely) governed 
by the principle of isomorphism: if a modal verb is available to express a 
particular modal concept, it pre-empts the use of another modal verb and, 
conversely, if no modal verb is available to express a particular modal concept, 
another modal verb may be used. The principle of isomorphism is certainly a 
motivating factor in language, but it is in conflict with another, and probably 
more powerful, motivating factor: the principle of polysemy. Polysemy is the 
most economic solution to deal with the infinity of concepts while keeping 
the stock of lexical expressions at a minimum. Polysemy is also a pervasive 
phenomenon in modality: all modal verbs are polysemous, and the challenge 
for cognitive linguists working on modality is to account for motivated links 
between their senses.
Probably the most important cognitive contribution to our understanding of 
modality is its characterisation in terms of force dynamics, i.e. the opposition 
of forces and counterforces or barriers. We experience force dynamics in the 
physical world when the wind blows our precious manuscript off the table, when 
we lift a suitcase (which the force of gravity pulls down), and when we bang 
our head against the door frame of an old cottage. Force-dynamic situations are 
not only ubiquitous in the physical world but, as has been shown by Johnson 
(1987), Talmy (1988), Sweetser (1990) and other cognitive linguists, also 
apply to the sociophysical world of root modality and the epistemic world of 
reasoning. The force constellations that characterise kinds of modality are thus 
experientially motivated.1 
1 For types of motivation see Radden & Panther (2004). 
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Studies of modality in terms of force dynamics have mainly been concerned 
with affirmative uses of modals. Their force-dynamic constellations are based 
on forces, counterforces and barriers that are lifted. As will be shown below, 
the force-dynamic notion that is central to negated modality is that of blockage. 
The following force-dynamic analysis of negated modals will always depart 
from their affirmative uses. It will, however, only be concerned with simple 
negations. moreover, the analysis will be restricted to deontic modality2 and 
epistemic modality.
0.4. Affirmative and negated deontic and epistemic modality
Deontic modality is concerned with the speaker’s directive attitude towards 
an action to be carried out and mainly includes obligations and permissions, as 
in (5a). Epistemic modality is concerned with the speaker’s inferred assessment 
of the potentiality of a state of affairs and mainly includes epistemic necessities 
and possibilities, as in (5b).
(5) a. You must/may go.  [deontic modality]
 b. This must/may be true. [epistemic modality]
The comparison between deontic and epistemic modality will be restricted 
to the basic modal verbs expressing these modalities, i.e. must, have (got) to, 
need to, may and can. These are also the modal verbs which display the most 
striking irregularities under negation. In their affirmative uses, the same modal 
verbs are used to denote the same types of deontic and epistemic modality, as 
illustrated in Table 1. In both types of modality, must and may denote subjective, 
or speaker-internal, attitudes and assessments, while have (got) to, need to and 
can denote attitudes and assessments that are based on objective, or speaker-
external, sources. These two uses of modality and the modals expressing them 
will be described as ‘subjective’ and ‘external’. In their negated uses, the 
negation may affect the proposition or the modality. The theoretically possible 
slots for negated modals are listed in Tables 2 and 3. The numbering of the 
types of modality corresponds to the section in which they are discussed. 
2 Deontic modality is one type of root modality, which also comprises intrinsic and disposition 
modality (Radden & Dirven 2007). Intrinsic modality is concerned with potentialities arising from 
speaker-external sources, as in The job must/can be done, which can be paraphrased as ‘It is necessary/
possible for the job to be done’. Epistemic modality, by contrast, is paraphrasable by ‘It is necessarily/
possibly the case that X’, as in It is necessarily the case that this is true. Disposition modality includes 
the notions of ‘ability’ or ‘propensity’ and ‘willingness’. These notions are also expressed by modal 
verbs, as in I can play the guitar, but are, strictly speaking, not modalities since they do not refer to 
potential situations but only evoke them, i.e. if I can play the guitar I am likely to do so.
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Table 1. Affirmative basic deontic and epistemic modals
1 Deontic modality Subjective External
1.1 obligation obl p must have to, need to
1.2 permission, enablement perm p may can
2 Epistemic modality Subjective External
2.1 necessity nec p must have to
2.2 possibility poss p may
Table 2. Negation of basic deontic modals
Negated deontic modality Subjective External
1.1.1 prohibition obl ∼p mustn’t 
1.1.2 exemption from obligation ∼obl p
don’t have to, 
need not
1.2.1 permission not to act perm ∼p may nót 
1.2.2 refusal of permission ∼perm p may not can’t 
Table 3. Negation of basic epistemic modals
Negated epistemic modality Subjective External
2.1.1 necessity that not nec ∼p
2.1.2 exemption from necessity ∼nec p
don’t have to, 
need not
2.2.1 possibility that not poss ∼p may not
2.2.2 impossibility ∼poss p can’t
The distribution of the modals and their negation raises a number of 
questions which are in need of explanation. For example, why is the modal 
mustn’t used to describe subjective prohibition (1.1.1) but not a subjective 
necessity that something is not the case (2.1.1)?; why is the modal can used to 
denote external permission/enablement (1.2) but not external possibility (2.2)?, 
why is the modal may not used to denote subjective refusal of permission 
(1.2.2) but not subjective impossibility (2.2.2)? These specific questions will 
be dealt with in the discussion of the individual modals below. 
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Tables 2 and 3 also reveal a general pattern in the distribution of negated 
modals: with the exception of deontic may not in the sense of refusal of 
permission (1.2.2), subjective modals are used to negate the proposition while 
external modals are used to negate the modality. Why should this be? An 
explanation for this striking division of labour between subjective and external 
modals will be offered in the conclusion of this paper. 
1. deOntic MOdals and their negatiOns
1.1. Obligations and their negations
Obligations are binding forces that are seen as compelling a person to carry 
out a certain action. The binding force may be a person, typically the speaker, 
or external circumstances. This distinction is reflected in the use of must for 
subjective obligations and have (got) to and need to for external obligations. 
Obligations involve the force-dynamic constellation of compulsion. 
1.1.1. Subjective obligation (must) and prohibition (mustn’t)
In subjective obligations, a person in authority (typically the speaker) 
compels a weaker person (typically the hearer) to carry out an action (p) against 
his will. The speaker’s motivation for imposing an obligation may be rational or 
irrational, and to the hearer an obligation may appear to be comprehensible or 
incomprehensible, expected or unexpected, etc. All that counts in an obligation 
is the asymmetric force relationship. 
In the figures representing force-dynamic constellations the following 
symbols are used: a stronger force is indicated by the bold “►” sign and a 
weaker counterforce by the “<” sign, the direction of a force is represented as 
a straight arrow and an intended but not realised direction as a broken arrow, 
a barrier blocking a force is represented by a vertical line, entities that are 
crucially involved in a force-dynamic constellation are, together with their 
force tendencies, indicated by circles, and speaker and hearer are abbreviated 
as “S” and “H”, respectively. 
Figure 1(a) represents the force-dynamic constellation underlying an 
obligation, as in You must go. Here, the speaker is the source of the obligation, 
hence the obligation is subjective. The meaning of a subjective obligation 
might be read as ‘the force of my (the speaker’s) authority compels you (the 
hearer) to do X’, i.e. the speaker’s force is stronger than that of the hearer so 
that the hearer will have to perform the action demanded of him (i.e. to go).
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Figure 1. Subjective obligation and (subjective) prohibition
Figure 1(b) represents the force-dynamic constellation underlying a 
subjective prohibition, as in You mustn’t go. A prohibition is an obligation 
imposed upon a person not to carry out an action. The speaker assumes that 
the hearer wants to, or may want to, perform a particular action and, due to 
his greater authority, blocks him from doing so. The bold vertical line in the 
figure indicates that the speaker (S) bars the hearer (H) from performing his 
own intended action, which is indicated by the dotted line. The prohibition 
expressed by You mustn’t go might thus be read as ‘the force of my authority 
compels you not to do X’ or ‘bars you from doing X’. The negation in the modal 
mustn’t applies to the proposition and not to the modality, which is indicated by 
∼go. Mustn’t thus expresses the concept ‘obl ∼p’. An explanation for this use of 
mustn’t is given in Section 1.1.3.
Subjective obligations and prohibitions may be imposed irrespective of 
the hearer’s intention to perform or not to perform the action, i.e. the speaker 
may impose them for purely precautionary reasons. Prohibitions are always 
imposed by people, not by external circumstances (see Section 1.1.3). External 
modals like don’t have to do not describe prohibitions but exemptions from an 
obligation (see below). 
1.1.2. External obligation (have to) and exemption from obligation (don’t have 
to)
Externally imposed obligations arise from circumstances such as rules, 
norms, or the intrinsic disposition of people or things. In social interactions, 
external obligations are generally felt to be less compelling and hence less 
face-threatening than obligations imposed by the speaker.3 External obligations 
3 The system of compelling modals has undergone dramatic changes in the last 200 years, especially 
in American English. Up to the early 19th century, the only strong obligation marker was must. by 
now the semi-modals (have) got to (53%) and have to (39%) have almost completely ousted must, 
(a) Obligation (obl p) (b) Prohibition (obl p) 
 
 
 ‘I compel you to go’ ‘I compel you not to go’ 
  You must go.  You mustn’t go.  
S ► < H H > go go 
 
  S
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are expressed by have (got) to and, for weaker obligations, need to. Thus, the 
subjective obligation expressed by must in sentence (6a) is felt to be more 
compelling than the external obligation expressed by have to in sentence 
(6b), which invokes external norms set for exams. An even less compelling 
obligation would be expressed by need to in sentence (6c), which invokes 
a person’s internal disposition and sounds more like a well-meant piece of 
advice.4
(6) a. This is what you must know to pass your exam.
 b. This is what you have to know to pass your exam.
 c. This is what you need to know to pass your exam.
Figure 2(a) represents the force-dynamic constellation underlying external 
obligations, as in You have to go/ need to go. The compelling forces of external 
obligations are lasting and unalterable circumstances and hence accepted as 
facts of the way the world is structured. Unalterable circumstances would 
be the coldness in the winter so that we have to wear a coat or our feeling 
of hunger so that we need to eat. Their expression by the stative verbs have 
and need is thus well-motivated. The source of external obligations as well as 
external exemptions is typically indeterminate, which is indicated by the force 
signs “►” and “<” without circles. 
Figure 2. External obligation and exemption from obligation.
Figure 2(b) represents the force-dynamic constellation of an exemption 
from an obligation, as in You don’t have to go/ need not go. An exemption 
presupposes the existence of an obligation which, however, does not apply 
which now only accounts for 8% of the compelling modals. These shifts have been attributed to 
two major factors in American English: “colloquialisation” and “democratisation”, i.e. emphasis on 
equality of power (see myhill 1996).
4 Cf. Sweetser (1990: 53f), who, following Talmy, points out that have to “has more of a meaning of 
being obliged by extrinsically imposed authority”, while “need implies that the obligation is imposed 
by something internal to the doer.” Hence, You have to stay home, because I say so can be said, 
whereas ?You need to stay home, because I say so sounds odd. 
(a) External obligation (obl p) (b) Exemption from obligation (obl p) 
 
 
 ‘Circumstances compel you to go’ ‘I/ circumstances don’t compel you to go’ 
  You have to go/ need to go.  You don’t have to go/ need not go.  
< H > < H 
go/go 
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in a particular case. Thus, You don’t have to pay income tax presupposes that 
you are obliged to pay income taxes like everybody else but that, due to a 
person’s authority or fortunate circumstances, you are exempted from this 
general obligation. As a result, you no longer have to perform the action of 
paying taxes, which you would have been compelled to perform. We may, 
of course, feel that we owe the state a share of our income and nevertheless 
pay income tax. In the figure, the vertical line indicates that the circumstances 
block the compelling force of the obligation, giving the hearer the freedom to 
act or not to act. Exemptions from an obligation as described by the external 
modals don’t have to, haven’t got to and need not thus affect the modality and 
not the proposition. 
1.1.3. Summary of deontic compelling situations
It may be helpful at this point of discussion to summarise the interim 
findings on deontic compelling situations within the force-dynamic framework. 
Obligations were characterised as modal situations in which a person in 
authority or external circumstances compel another person to perform an 
action against his will, i.e. the force of an obligation can be subjective (must) 
or external (have to). The force-dynamic counterpart of an obligation is a 
prohibition. Prohibitions are modal situations in which a person in authority, 
or rules or regulations compel another person not to perform an action. Unlike 
obligations, however, prohibitions are always imposed by humans and not 
by external circumstances. This also applies to rules and regulations which 
state prohibitions at a more generalised level. Rules and regulations are set by 
persons in authority in order to prescribe people’s conduct and thereby delimit 
their actions. For example, a highway code specifies a rule that You must 
not drive with a blood alcohol level of more than 80 mg/100ml. Prohibitions 
are thus goal-directed and always subjective; hence they are expressed by 
mustn’t, not by don’t have to. The preceding section has shown that we may 
be exempted from an obligation. Exemptions are modal situations in which a 
person in authority or external circumstances exempts another person from 
being subjected to an obligation, i.e. the compelling force of an obligation is 
blocked. both subjective and external exemptions are expressed by don’t have 
to; the use of must not for subjective exemptions is pre-empted because it is 
already reserved for prohibitions. These three deontic compelling situations 
and the modals expressing them are listed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Obligations, prohibitions and exemptions
obligation 
obl p
prohibition 
obl ∼p
exemption 
∼obl p
subjective must mustn’t don’t have to
external have to ∅ don’t have to
The lexical distinction made between the sources of an obligation reflects 
the social impact an act of obligation is felt to have. It may be of paramount 
importance to communicate whether an obligation is imposed by a person or 
is due to external circumstances; hence the two modal forms must and have to 
in English. Prohibitions, by contrast, can only be set by humans, be it directly 
or via rules; hence there is no need for a modal denoting external prohibition. 
The concept of an externally determined prohibition does, however, exist. 
This meaning may be implicated when external circumstances are said to 
prevent a person from doing something, as in You can’t come in, which may 
be interpreted as meaning ‘external circumstances compel me not to let you 
in’. The prevention of an enablement (see Section 1.2.2) may thus have the 
illocutionary force of a prohibition, so that can’t fills the conceptual gap of 
external prohibition. Lastly, English does not distinguish between exemptions 
granted by humans and exemptions inherent in the circumstances. The modal 
forms used for both, i.e. don’t have to, haven’t got to and need not, suggest 
external circumstances as their sources. The distinction between subjective 
and external sources may, of course, be relevant in communication. Imagine 
the following fictitious dialogue: 
(7) mother to her daughter: “billy, you must visit your grandma on her  
 birthday.” 
 Grandmother to billy: “It would be very kind of you, billy, but you  
 don’t have to.” 
The mother invokes her parental authority and states her obligation by 
using the subjective modal must. Grandmother, however, would prefer to see 
her grandson visit her of his own free will and therefore “exempts” him from 
the obligation laid by his mother. Her exemption is expressed by the external 
modal don’t have to, which, however, may also understood subjectively. This 
meaning can also be expressed explicitly by saying “You don’t have to visit 
me, not because of me” or “not for my sake”, etc. The sense of subjective 
exemption is thus included in the overall use of the external modal don’t have to. 
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1.2. Permissions and their negations
Permissions refer to the speaker’s attitude towards a person’s potential 
action, which the speaker does not prevent the person from performing. As 
with obligations, the source of a permission may be subjective or external to 
the speaker. For example, an applicant’s inquiry about the possibility of still 
submitting a paper for a conference may be answered by personally granting 
permission, using may as in (8a), or by hinting at external circumstances, using 
can as in (8b).
(8) a. You may still submit a paper.
 b. You can still submit a paper. 
In sentence (8a), a person in authority, for example the organizer of the 
conference, relinquishes his power to turn down the request and thus gives 
a promising young scholar the chance to present her research on palatal 
glides in Old Georgian. This is the type of situation we normally associate 
with permission-granting. In situation (8b), external circumstances such as 
an extended deadline enable scholars interested in attending the conference 
to submit their papers at a later point in time. The organizer merely informs 
the applicant that external circumstances apply but does not strictly grant 
permission herself. In terms of force dynamics, this situation represents an 
enablement. As pointed out by Sweetser (1990: 53), both aspects exert similar 
influences on a situation and tend to overlap.5 Thus, may of permission may 
also be thought of as enabling a person, and can of enablement may also be 
thought of as removing a restriction. Since enabling a person is less face-
threatening than imposing a restriction, the use of can has become a more 
casual and politer form of expressing permissions than may. In their use with 
negations, however, the conceptual distinction between permissive may and 
enabling can is still preserved.
1.2.1. Permission (may), permission not to act (may nót), and refusal of 
permission (may not)
Permissions which are based on the speaker’s authority involve his removal 
of a potential barrier restraining the hearer’s action, as sketched in Figure 
3(a). 
5 Sweetser (1990: 53) illustrates the difference in meaning between can expressing ‘positive 
enablement’ and may expressing ‘removal of restriction’ by analogy to a car. A positive enablement 
is comparable to a full gas tank, and a negated restriction is comparable to an open garage door. both 
aspects are normally present in permissions. 
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Figure 3. Permission, permission not to act, and refusal of permission
May is the only modal that allows the two scopes of negation: negation of 
the proposition, i.e. permission not to act, and negation of the modality, i.e. 
refusal of permission. Normally people ask for permission when they want 
to do something rather than when they want to refrain from doing something. 
Permitting a person not to act is therefore a rare situation. There is, in fact, no 
need to code this notion because an act of permission-granting includes the 
possibility of not carrying out the act permitted. Figure 3(b) represents the 
force-dynamic constellation underlying a ‘permission not to act’. With respect 
to its result, this constellation is identical to that of a ‘permission to act’; they 
only differ with respect to the permission-seeker’s wish to act or not to act, 
which is indicated in Figure 3(b) by the vertical line in the hearer’s circle. 
The concept ‘be permitted not to act’ is therefore not lexicalised by a modal 
verb of its own. Yet, this concept has its ecological niche in its contrast to ‘be 
permitted to act’. For example, a smoking area might be designated as You may 
not smoke here, where nót would be stressed in speech. Needless to say, such 
situations have an ironic ring. 
A permission may be refused on the basis of a person’s authority, by using 
may not, or on the basis of external circumstances, by using can’t. The subjective 
refusal of permission, diagrammed in Figure 3(c), is the exact counterpart of 
an act of permission-granting. In terms of force-dynamics, the speaker closes 
a barrier and thus blocks the weaker force of the permission-seeker. This 
authoritarian use of may in permission refusals is pragmatically motivated. 
The inherent asymmetric power relationship between permission-seeker and 
permission-granter may, in certain contextual situations, be understood in a 
directive sense. For example, a judge who announces that “The next witness 
may come in” does, of course, not leave it up to the witness to come in or not to 
(a) Permission (b) Permission not to act (c) Refusal of permission  
  (perm p)   (perm p)  (perm p) 
 
 
 
 ‘I allow you to go’  ‘I allow you not to go’ ‘I don’t allow you to go’ 
 You may go.   You may nót go.  You may not go. 
S 
 
S 
H > 
go/go go/go 
H 
go 
H > 
S 
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come in; nor does the teacher who says to a student “You may go on reading” 
intend to give him the option to decline. 
1.2.2. Enablement (can) and prevention of enablement (can’t)
As observed in Section 1.2.1 above, situations such as You can go involve a 
person’s enablement due to external circumstances and do not, or not primarily, 
depend on the speaker’s granting permission. In its force-dynamic constellation 
in Figure 4(a), the hearer’s force of enablement is not barred and the speaker 
only plays a marginal role: he may report or endorse the state of affairs but 
does not strictly permit the enabling event. In the figures below, the speaker’s 
marginal role is indicated by a dotted circle.
Figure 4. Enablement and prevention of enablement
Figure 4(b) represents the force-dynamic constellation of the prevention of 
an enablement, as in You can’t go. The stronger force of external circumstances 
and/or possibly the speaker’s authority bar a person’s enablement to act. being 
prevented from carrying out one’s plans due to adverse circumstances is a very 
common situation, whereas situations in which circumstances enable us not to 
act are rather unusual. It therefore does not come as a surprise that can’t, just 
like the negated obligation modals don’t have to and need not, only affects the 
modality and is not used to negate the proposition, i.e. it does not mean ‘enable 
a person not to act’. 
The prevention of an enablement (can’t) is close in meaning to a refusal 
of permission (may not) and, due to the equivalence relation ‘∼perm p ≡ obl 
∼p’, to a prohibition (mustn’t). In all three situations, a person’s desired act is 
blocked from taking effect. As should be expected, each of the three negated 
modals presents the situations in its own force-dynamic way. Consider the 
following sentences: 
(a) Enablement (perm p) (b) Prevention of enablement (perm p) 
 
 
 
 ‘Circumstances enable you to go’ ‘Circumstances don’t allow you to go’ 
 You can go.  You can’t go.  
H > ► 
go 
> 
go 
 
H > 
 
SS
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(9) a. You can’t come in. Not with that dog.
 b. You may not come in. I have nothing to say to you.
 c. You mustn’t come in. We mustn’t disturb my parents. 
In using can’t in (9a), the speaker refuses permission by appealing to 
external circumstances such as rules of the house that prevent her from 
admitting the visitor into the house; in using may not in (9b), the speaker’s 
denial of permission rests on her own decision; and in using mustn’t in (9c), the 
speaker intimates that there is a strong compelling force prohibiting her from 
letting the person come in. 
2. ePisteMic MOdals and their negatiOns
Cognitive-linguistic studies of modality have shown that epistemic and 
deontic modality are based on similar force-dynamic constellations. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that modal verbs systematically display deontic/
epistemic polysemy. The controversial issue of the nature of the motivated link 
between the two types of modality shall be of no concern here. 
2.1. Necessities and their negations
An assessment of epistemic necessity comes close to factual reality but still 
involves an inferential process: the speaker infers from available evidence that 
only one possible conclusion can be drawn. As argued by Langacker (1991: 
273-81), epistemic judgements are typically based on what he describes as an 
“evolutionary momentum”. In conclusions which are assumed to be necessarily 
the case, the evolutionary momentum is very powerful. For example, confronted 
with the task of hooking up a DVD-player to a TV set, we will carefully 
follow the instructions step by step, and when all the cables are connected, 
the evolutionary momentum of our work allows us to proudly announce: 
“This must be right now”–maybe with a little tinge of uncertainty left. As has 
been shown by Sweetser (1990), the force-dynamic constellation of epistemic 
necessity corresponds to that of obligation: the evolutionary momentum 
corresponds to the imposer’s force, the tinge of uncertainty left corresponds 
to the hearer’s unwillingness to act, and the conclusion reached corresponds 
to the enforced action. Like deontic attitudes, epistemic assessments may be 
based on subjective or external sources. 
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2.1.1. Subjective necessity (must)
The notion ‘subjective necessity’ is understood in the sense of the only 
possible conclusion a speaker is compelled to draw from available evidence. 
This epistemic situation is expressed by using must, as in the sentence This 
must be right. This force-dynamic constellation is sketched in Figure 5(a), 
where the bold arrow indicates an evolutionary momentum which serves as 
evidence for the speaker’s assessment, indicated by the broken arrow. The 
evolutionary momentum is thought of as evolving of its own and not as being 
propelled by an external force; hence the drawing of this constellation does not 
include an external force sign. 
Figure 5. Subjective necessity and necessity that not
The epistemic concept ‘∼nec p’ is, like the deontic concept ‘∼obl p’, not 
expressed by mustn’t but by one of the external modals (see Section 2.1.2 
below). Surprisingly, however, the epistemic concept ‘nec ∼p’ is not expressed 
by mustn’t either, although the corresponding deontic concept ‘obl ∼p’ 
is coded by mustn’t and describes a prohibition. Figure 5(b) represents the 
force-dynamic constellation of the concept of a necessity that something is 
not the case, as in It is necessarily the case that Jack isn’t back home. Why 
should mustn’t not be available to express this epistemic situation, i.e. why 
don’t we normally say *This mustn’t be right or *Jack mustn’t be back home.6 
Like affirmative must, negative mustn’t would invoke an inferential process 
in which evidence compels the speaker to draw the only possible conclusion. 
Evidence normally allows us to draw positive conclusions, i.e. that something 
is the case. For example, when Jack’s car is parked in front of his house we 
6 Palmer (21990: 61) concedes that mustn’t may be used instead of can’t where it is important to make 
a judgement in terms of necessity rather than possibility, as in He mustn’t be there after all in the sense 
of ‘The only possible conclusion is that he is not there’. 
(a) Necessity (nec p) (b) Necessity that not (nec p) 
 
 
 
 ‘Evidence compels me to conclude ‘Evidence compels me to conclude  
  that this is right’  that this is not right’ 
  This must be right.  (*This mustn’t be right.)  
right 
this this 
right 
► S   
  S 
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will normally infer that he parked it there, and when the lights in the living-
room have been turned on we will infer that he (or some member of his family) 
did so. Negative conclusions, i.e. that something is not the case, are normally 
drawn, not from positive evidence, but from negative evidence, i.e. lack of 
evidence. Thus, when Jack’s car is not parked in front of his house or the lights 
in the living-room are not on, we may infer that Jack is not home. However, 
missing evidence does usually not lead to one possible conclusion only: the car 
may not be parked in front of Jack’s house because it is at a car repair shop, and 
the lights may not be on because Jack is taking a nap. Since lack of evidence 
is rarely conclusive, the use of epistemic mustn’t is not licensed. It is probably 
for this reason that the notion ‘nec ∼p’ is commonly rendered by its logically 
equivalent concept ‘∼poss p’, as in Jack can’t be back home, i.e. as the negation 
of a possibility (see Section 2.2.2 below). 
2.1.2. External necessity (have to) and exemption from necessity (don’t have 
to) 
Like obligations, necessities may be based on the force of speaker-external 
circumstances and are then expressed by have (got) to. Leech (1971: 77) 
describes the difference in meaning between epistemic must and have (got) 
to as that of ‘factual necessity’ versus ‘theoretical necessity’. These two types 
of necessity may be illustrated with the answers given to a multiple-choice 
question. In picking the answer we are almost certain to be the correct one we 
stick to facts as we know them, while by excluding the answers that appear 
to be incorrect we deduce the correct answer as the only one left. A person 
using the “factual” method might say This must be the correct answer, while 
a person adopting the “theoretical” method might say This has (got) to be the 
correct answer.7 The compelling force leading to a theoretical necessity as 
expressed by have to is stronger than that leading to a factual necessity, as 
expressed by must. In terms of force dynamics, a factual necessity is based on 
evidence, while a theoretical necessity is arrived at by deduction from external 
circumstances which may be seen as having an internal power of logic. The 
7 The following problem and answer taken from a Yahoo site on Words and Wordplay may serve as 
an illustration of the method of arriving at a solution by exclusion.
Choose the sentence in which the italicized pronoun agrees in number with its italicized antecedent.
maureen called the children for his meal.A. 
The boys want their dessert now.b. 
mary and Jill won’t eat her vegetables.C. 
The waiter refilled their glasses as they emptied it.D. 
best Answer - Chosen by Voters
The answer is b. The italics didn’t show, but the other sentences aren’t correct so that has to be the 
correct answer. [bold print G.R.]
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force constellation of an affirmative external necessity is diagrammed in Figure 
6(a).
Figure 6. Subjective necessity and necessity that not
Figure 6(b) represents the force-dynamic constellation of an exemption from 
necessity. The negation of a modal of external necessity affects the modality. 
Thus, This doesn’t have to be right means that ‘it is not necessarily the case 
that this is right’, i.e. the speaker may conclude that this is right, as assumed 
before, or wrong. The epistemic concept ‘∼nec p’ corresponds to the deontic 
concept ‘∼obl p’, i.e. an exemption from an obligation. The concept ‘∼nec p’ 
may be seen as an exemption from a necessity established by rules, beliefs or 
conditions that normally hold but do not necessarily apply to this particular 
case. For example, a student taking a course on Cognitive Grammar may be 
surprised to discover that grammar doesn’t have to be boring. The student 
thus exempts the cognitive approach to grammar from the general belief that 
grammar is necessarily boring. 
modals of necessity do not negate the proposition. In Section 2.1.1 we saw 
that the subjective modal mustn’t is hardly used to express the concept ‘nec 
∼p’, and the external modals don’t have to or need not are even less suited to 
describe the meaning ‘circumstances compel me to draw the conclusion that 
this is not the case’, since these modals are already pre-empted to express 
the meaning of “epistemic exemption”. In the same way that, as argued in 
Section 1.1.3, we do not think of circumstances compelling us not to act (‘obl 
∼p’), we do not think of external circumstances compelling us to conclude that 
something is not the case. Here the logical equivalent ‘∼poss p’, i.e. rejecting 
a possibility, and its expression by can provide a viable alternative for both 
the subjective and external versions of the concept ‘nec ∼p’–although their 
meanings are, of course, not identical. 
(a) External necessity (nec p) (b) Exemption from necessity (nec p) 
 
 
 
 ‘Circumstances compel me  ‘Circumstances don’t compel me  
  to conclude that this is right’   to conclude that this is right’ 
  This has to be right.  This doesn’t have to be/ need not be right.  
S 
► right 
this this 
right/right 
S 
► > 
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2.2. Possibilities and their negations
Epistemic possibilities correspond to deontic permissions. However, 
the behaviour of both affirmative and negated modals reveals fundamental 
differences between the world of social interaction and the world of 
reasoning. 
2.2.1. Subjective possibility (may) and possibility that something is not the 
case (may not)
The force-dynamic constellation of subjective possibility corresponds to 
that of subjective permission: the permission-seeker’s force corresponds to the 
force of the evolutionary momentum, and the permission-granter’s authority in 
relinquishing his force corresponds to the speaker’s relinquishing of potential 
counter-evidence in his reasoning. This force-dynamic constellation, in which 
the speaker lifts a barrier in reasoning, is sketched in Figure 7(a). 
Figure 7. Subjective possibility and ‘possibility that not’
The negated modal of a subjective possibility only negates the proposition, 
i.e. it describes a possibility that a speaker deems not to be the case. In Figure 
7(b) this meaning is indicated by the barrier closed by the speaker. This 
force-dynamic constellation is comparable to that of a permission not to act. 
However, while granting a person permission not to do something is a rather 
anomalous situation, thinking of the possibility that a state of affairs does not 
hold is a perfectly common situation. It applies to situations where the speaker 
feels that contradictory evidence outweighs confirming evidence. It is thus 
only natural for epistemic may and may not to denote different things: may 
conveys a higher degree of assessed likelihood than may not. This can be seen 
from the contexts in which each form may occur. May, but not may not, readily 
  
(a) Subjective possibility (poss p) (b) Subjective possibility that not (poss p) 
 
 
 
 ‘Evidence makes me deem it ‘Evidence makes me deem it  
  possible that this is right’  possible that this is not right’ 
  This may be right.  This may not be right.  
S ► 
this right/right 
right/right this 
S
  
 > 
< 
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co-occurs with yes, as in Yes, that may be true, while may not is more likely to 
co-occur with no, as in No, that may not be true. 
May not is not used to negate a possibility, i.e. it does not express the idea 
that ‘evidence does not make me deem it possible that this is the case’. In this 
respect its epistemic use differs from its deontic use, where may not is used 
to express a refusal of permission. What makes the deontic concept ‘∼perm 
p’ more appropriate to be expressed by a modal verb than its corresponding 
concept ‘∼poss p’? In Section 1.2.1 we conjectured that the motivation for 
using may not in a directive sense might be the asymmetric power relationship 
between the permission-seeker and the permission-granter. There is, of course, 
no inherent asymmetry between a state of affairs that is deemed possible and 
another one that is deemed not possible: both are balanced against each other 
in the speaker’s assessment. The subjective notion of ‘not deeming something 
possible’ is, therefore, like that of ‘not concluding that something is the case’, 
covered by its corresponding external notion and expressed by can’t, as in This 
can’t be true. 
2.2.2. External possibility (?can) and its negation (can’t)
External possibilities correspond to external permissions, which involve the 
notion of enablement. Here, however, social interaction and reasoning differ 
markedly. In the deontic world, a distinction between (subjective) permission as 
in You may go and (external) enablement as in You can go is experientially well 
motivated: in situations of permission the speaker has the authority to bar the 
hearer from acting, whereas in situations of enablement the speaker cannot bar 
the hearer from acting but is still somehow involved as a kind of permission-
giver (see Section 1.2.2). In the epistemic word, we may, as seen above, bar 
potential counter-evidence in our assessment of a possibility in sentences like 
It may not be right, but once a thought is accepted by us as valid it is valid. 
This especially applies to circumstances which are seen as unalterable and 
absolute. For example, a friend may advise you not to eat fast food because 
there is a high probability that it will make you fat. She may express her piece 
of advice as a possibility by using can (Fast food can make you fat) but, since 
she has already internalised this idea as valid, she may as well describe it as a 
downright assertion: Fast food makes you fat. The sense of external possibility 
which can expresses, or would express if it were commonly used, comes very 
close to the compelling meaning of external necessity or asserted truth. The 
use of can of possibility is therefore conceptually not required, but it is not 
excluded either: it is mainly used in generic statements such as Smoking can 
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be hazardous to your health. Its force-dynamic constellation is represented in 
Figure 8(a). 
Figure 8. External possibility and impossibility
The sense of ‘external possibility’ of the modal can is almost exclusively 
restricted to its negated form can’t. Its negation only affects the modality 
(‘∼poss p’), i.e. can’t describes an impossibility. Deeming something 
impossible is extremely common in our reasoning. Epistemic can’t is not only 
used in opposition to external possibility, but also in opposition to subjective 
possibility and to subjective and external necessity, as demonstrated in Table 5. 
Table 5. Uses of epistemic can’t
Affirmative Negative ‘∼poss p’
external ‘poss p’: ?This can be right. ‘∼poss p’: This can’t be right.
subjective ‘poss p’: This may be right. ‘∼poss p’: This can’t be right.
external ‘nec p’: This has to be right. ‘neg ∼p’: This can’t be right.
subjective ‘nec p’: This must be right. ‘neg ∼p’: This can’t be right.
The notion ‘impossibility’ invokes assumptions about the way the world 
is, or rather is not, structured. In conversation, a negated utterance is normally 
used in response to an affirmative utterance. This means that when a speech 
participant wants to refute another participant’s assessment, she invariably 
invokes the structure of the world when she uses a negated modal verb, which 
can only be can’t. In its ubiquitous use of can’t epistemic modality differs most 
markedly from deontic modality, where can’t is only used to negate external 
(a) External possibility (poss p) (b) Impossibility (poss p) 
 
 
 
 ‘Circumstances make me deem it ‘Circumstances bar me from 
  possible to be right’  deeming this to be right’ 
  (?This can be right.)  This can’t be right.  
> S 
this right 
right 
this 
> 
< S
  
 > 
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modalities, i.e. prevention of an enablement (1.2.2) and, as a suppletive form, 
external prohibition (1.1.1). 
3. cOnclusiOns
The force-dynamic analysis of the negated basic modals of English allowed 
us to see that most of their seemingly erratic uses are motivated. We should 
now also be in the position to answer the question posed in Section 0.4: why 
are subjective modals (mustn’t and may not) used to negate the proposition 
while external modals (don’t have to, haven’t got to, need not and can’t) are 
used to negate the modality? 
Conceptually, a modal situation consists of the modality component and the 
proposition, and an affirmation or negation affects both the modality and the 
proposition. The function of modality is to locate a situation in potential reality. 
The modality of a situation is, therefore, external to the proposition and most 
directly affected by an affirmation or negation.8 The proposition, by contrast, 
is dependent on the modality; it is therefore normally only indirectly affected 
by an affirmation or negation, but may also be directly affected. In affirmative 
modal situations, the affirmation directly affects the modality positively and 
indirectly affects the proposition positively as well. Thus, in the obligation You 
must go, we expect you to go, and in the permission You may go, you are more 
likely to go than to stay. 
Negated modal situations are more complex. In negations of the modality, 
the negation directly affects the modality and indirectly the proposition. Thus, 
in the refusal of permission You can’t go, we expect you not to go, and in the 
exemption of an obligation You don’t have to go, we expect you not to go without 
excluding the possibility that you may go. In negations of the proposition, the 
overall affirmation of the situation affects the modality positively but does not 
affect the proposition–the proposition is directly affected by the negation. Thus, 
the prohibition You must not go represents an obligation in which we expect 
you not to go, and a permission not to act as in You may nót go represents a 
permission in which you are more likely to stay than to go. 
These three types of situations are represented in Table 6. It may be a 
coincidence that the negator and the unit affected by it are ordered iconically: 
in the negation of the modality as in don’t have to, not precedes the modal verb, 
and in the negation of the proposition as in must not, not precedes the verb of 
the proposition. 
8 This view also applies to the structure of language. Thus, in the tradition of Generative Semantics, 
modals have been treated as higher predicates dominating the embedded sentence.
Affirmative and negated modality 191
Table 6. Affirmation and negation in modal situations
situation modal verb modality proposition example
(a) affirmation non-negated positive positive/negative permission may
(b) negation negated negative negative/positive
exemption: don’t 
have to
(c) negation negated positive negative
prohibition: must 
not
(a) Non-negated modals (must, have to, may, can) directly affect the 
modality and indirectly the proposition. The modality is always positive, and 
the proposition is, as a rule, also positively affected but does not exclude a 
negative outcome in human acts of permission-granting and assessments of 
possibility. External circumstances, on the other hand, are subject to physical 
laws or social rules and hence are only thought of as having a positive 
outcome. 
(b) Negated modals that directly affect the modality describe exemptions 
from an obligation or necessity (don’t have to, need not), refusals of permission 
(may not, can’t), and impossibilities (can’t). Their negative modality typically 
leads to a negative proposition, without excluding a positive outcome in 
exemptions that involve humans. Thus, a person who is advised that he doesn’t 
have to take a taxi may follow your advice and walk to his hotel or may take 
a taxi anyway. 
(c) Negated modals that directly affect the proposition describe prohibitions 
(mustn’t), permissions not to act (may nót), and possibilities that something is 
not the case (may not). These modal situations necessarily involve the goal-
directed power of humans, who are able to direct a person to a negative goal or 
allow their reasoning to come to a negative conclusion. 
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